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The Semantics of Paranumerals
*
 
To appear in : 
Indefiniteness and Plurality (eds. Tasmowski & Vogeleer), Benjamins, Linguistics Today Series 
 
Francis Corblin 
Université Paris-Sorbonne & Institut Jean Nicod (CNRS) 
 
Abstract: 
The paper contrasts two semantic subclasses among expressions combining with numerals 
exemplified respectively by at least and more than, and contrasts these expressions with bare 
numerals. Even if truth conditions are often close, dynamic properties, especially anaphora 
and apposition, give a basis for distinguishing numerals, numerical comparatives (more than), 
and set comparators (at least). The paper makes the following claims : 1) bare numerals 
introduce in the representation a set of exactly n individuals; 2) “numerical comparatives” 
(more/less than n) only introduce in the representation the maximal set of individuals Σx 
satisfying the conjunction of the NP and VP constraints, and compare the cardinality of this 
set to n ; “set comparators” (at least/at most) introduce two sets in the representation, Σx, and 
a witness set, the existence of which is asserted, which is constrained as a set of n Xs, X being 
the descriptive content of the NP.  
The paper is presented in the framework of Discourse Representation Theory and is based 
on French data. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Besides numerals (one, two, three…), there is a set of expressions which combine 
very nicely, if not exclusively, with numerals, like: at least, at most, exactly, more 
than, less than. Let us call these expressions paranumerals; this term is purely 
descriptive and does not contain any implicit analysis of these expressions, for which 
we cannot rely on a received terminology. Similar expressions exist in many 
languages and for the sake of illustration I will use in this paper French data 
including : au moins (at least), au plus (at most), exactement (exactly), plus de (more 
than), moins de (less than) en tout (in all). 
Paranumerals can combine with numerals, but, as a rule, they do not combine with 
quantifiers and indefinites: plus de deux (more than two), moins de trois (less than 
three), exactement quatre (exactly four)/ *plus de plusieurs (more than several), *au 
moins peu (at least few). For some indefinites, the behaviour of paranumerals is not 
regular: *exactement quelques (exactly some), plus de quelques (more than some], au 
moins quelques (at least quelques), au plus quelques (at most some). Some 
paranumerals combine with definites, others do not
1
 : 
 
(1) a. J’ai invité au moins Pierre et Jean. 
    ‘I invited at least Peter and John.’ 
 b. J’ai invité Pierre et Jean au plus. 
  ‘I invited at most Peter and John.’ 
c. Au moins Pierre et Jean sont venus 
    ‘At least Peter and John came.’ 
 d. *Plus que Pierre et Jean sont venus 
 ‘More than Peter and John came.’ 
e. *Moins de Pierre et Jean sont venus. 
     ‘Less than Peter and John came.’ 
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The semantic literature, in particular the algebraic approaches of Generalized 
Quantifier Theory  (Barwise & Cooper 1981) and Boolean semantics (Keenan & Stavi 
1986) generally tends to take paranumerals as having the same behavior and to see 
them as close to numerals; this view is based on the following list of truth-conditional 
equivalences: 
Un (one)   ↔ au moins un (at least one) 
plus de n (more than n) ↔ au moins n+1 (at least n +1) 
n exactement  (n exactly)  ↔ n en tout (n in all)  ↔  n au plus et n au moins (n 
at most and at least) 
 
In this paper, I will try to substantiate the following claims : 
1) the semantics of (bare) numerals and numeral+paranumerals should be sharply 
contrasted, in particular the difference between n and at least n;  
2) there are at least two different kinds of paranumerals exemplified respectively 
by : 
 -  plus de   (more than)   
-  au moins  (at least)    
    
3) it is difficult to say for certain if exactement (exactly) is of the more than kind or 
of the at least kind, but it can be established that en tout (in all) and exactement 
(exactly) behave differently. 
The two first claims will be discussed in details in this paper, and for the third one 
we will only introduce the discussion. 
The general perspective adopted here for analyzing the semantics of these 
expressions combines truth-conditional semantics (which tends to see these 
expressions as close) and a deeper exploration of their dynamic properties, based on 
two kinds of data: 
A. the interpretation of definite anaphora to these expressions, an exploration 
initiated by Kadmon (1987) and illustrated by examples like (1) : 
(1) Pierre invitera au moins deux personnes. Il les recevra dans l'entrée. 
 ‘Peter will invite at least two persons. He will receive them in the hall.’ 
In such examples the problem is to determine how the pronoun is interpreted : as a 
reference to a set of exactly two persons, or as a reference to the maximal set of 
invited persons. 
B. the interpretation of appositions, exemplified by examples like (2) : 
(2) Pierre invitera au plus deux personnes : son père et sa mère. 
 ‘Peter will invite at most two persons : his father and his mother.’ 
To some extent, apposition data can be used to elucidate the problem raised in (A) : 
it seems that apposition is often interpreted as an enumeration of the set introduced by 
the expression it is appended to. 
I will argue that in order to understand correctly the semantics of the expressions of 
form (paranumeral) nAB, one must distinguish two sets: 
 - the maximal set of individuals satisfying the intersection : Emax= A∩B 
- a set of exactly n members : En 
More precisely the claim is that what distinguishes these expressions is the nature 
of the set(s) relevant for the computation of their representation. The relevant sets are 
given in the following table, in which we introduce a working terminology for the 
different categories we wish to distinguish:  
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Expression    relevant set(s)  example 
Numerals :    En   three boys 
Numerical comparatives :  Emax    more than three boys 
Set comparators :   En, Emax   at least two boys 
 
The paper gives empirical arguments based on the dynamic properties of these 
expressions for supporting the claim, and proposes a semantics based on the relevant 
sets which is formulated in the Discourse Representation Framework (Kamp & Reyle 
1993). The paper is grounded on the “two set” analysis introduced in Corblin (to 
appear) for expressions of the at least paradigm (set comparators). I will not repeat 
here some details, discussions and references that the interested reader may find in 
this paper, in order to keep the focus of the present work on a contrastive approach.  
 
 
2. The semantics of (bare) numerals. A quick view. 
 
The classical truth-conditional analysis
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 of sentences using a bare numeral n in a 
structure nAB is as follows : 
(3)  [[n AB]] = 1 iff  A∩B ≥ n  
It holds that the nAB sentence is true if and only if the cardinal of the intersection of 
A and B is at least n. 
It is, in general, supplemented by the classical pragmatic Gricean implicature, 
(which does not hold for at least n sentences), stating that the speaker has no evidence 
that A∩B>1.  
(4) n = A∩ B    From (3) and the Gricean implicature. 
The approach of bare numerals as indefinites adopted by Discourse Representation 
Theory admits (3), is agnostic about (4), but holds that the statement n AB 
"introduces" for the following discourse a set of exactly n members, En ⊆ Emax. 
Consider for instance (5) : 
(5) Deux étudiants ont appelé.      
 ‘Two students called.’ 
(5) is considered true if more than two did, but cannot be followed by (6) : 
(6) # Ces trois étudiants étaient Pierre, Jean and Nicole.  
 ‘These three students were Pierre, Jean and Nicole.’  
The ingredients of the solution for accommodating these data are represented in 
(7) : 
(7)  
 X   Truthful embedding iff Emax = S∩C ≥ 2 
 student (X) 
 X = 2  Accessible for anaphora En : En ⊆ Emax , En = 2 
 called  (X)    
    with S for students, C for callers. 
  
  
It amounts to defining the truth of (7) by means of a truthful embedding, and to take 
anaphora as a clue about what is made accessible by the sentence for a later reference. 
The kind of dynamic data subsumed by (8) , 
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(8) Deux étudiants ont appelé... Ces deux (#trois)  étudiants… 
 ‘Two students called… These two (#three) students…. 
can be interpreted roughly as follows.  
The demonstrative NP These n students must be identified to a previously 
introduced discourse referent (DR), and its descriptive content n students must be 
satisfied by this DR. So, if the descriptive content of the demonstrative is "exactly" n , 
then its antecedent DR must be exactly n. That These n Ns means exactly n Ns seems 
to be established by the falsity or unacceptability of (9) and by the fact that (10) is a 
tautology : 
(9) *Ces deux étudiants sont Pierre, Jean et Nicole.  
 ‘These two students are Pierre, Jean and Nicole.’ 
(10) Ces n Ns sont {a, …}E →  E =n  
It must be concluded that These n Ns refers to exactly n Ns, which establishes that n 
Ns introduces exactly n Ns.
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In the DRT approach, it is thus the (bare) numeral itself which introduces a set of 
exactly n Ns. This is a very important difference with Kadmon (1987) and Evans 
(1980), which makes the definite NP itself responsible for the unique (or maximal) 
interpretation of the anaphoric definite NP. 
The apposition data seems to show that it is actually the numeral which is relevant. 
In sentences where a list of proper names is appended to an nAs NP, sentences with a 
list of more than n names is not acceptable. Sentences with a list of less than n names 
is not acceptable, except with an intonative marking indicating clearly that the 
enumeration is not exhaustive. 
(11) Deux personnes sont venues : *Pierre, Jean and André.  
 ‘Two persons came : *Pierre, Jean and André.’ 
(12) Est-ce que deux personnes sont venues? Oui.  *Pierre, Jean et André. 
 ‘Did two persons come? Yes : *Pierre, Jean and André.’ 
Anaphora and apposition show, in other words, that the semantics of bare numerals 
in simple episodic sentences n AB introduces a set of exactly n members satisfying A 
and B. 
 
3. Numerical comparatives: plus de, moins de. [more than, less than] 
 
We use, as a working terminology, the label “numerical comparatives” for the French 
equivalent of more than n, less than n. 
(13) Plus de cinq personnes sont venues.   
 ‘More than five persons came.’ 
(14) Moins de vingt étudiants se sont inscrits.  
 ‘Less than twenty students registred.’ 
According to the classical view, an expression like more than n is true is the same 
models than the numeral expression n+1.  
(15) J'ai écrit trois articles ↔ J'ai écrit plus de deux articles. 
 ‘I wrote three papers ↔ ‘I wrote  more than two papers.’ 
This sounds roughly correct, at least if one operates only with integers on the 
considered domain; if for instance one is allowed to consider fractions, the 
equivalence does not hold, as exemplified by (16) : 
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(16) Cela mesure trois kilomètres. ≠  Cela mesure plus de deux kilomètres. 
 ‘It is three kilometers long.’ ≠  ‘It is more than two kilometers long.’ 
Since one can consider, say two kilometers and a half, it is not true that being more 
than two kilometers long implies being three kilometers long. 
 
But the semantics of numerals and paranumerals are different. It can be shown that 
numerical comparatives do not introduce a set of exactly n members, as numerals do 
(see §2 above). Consider, for instance, the contrast between (17) and (18) : 
(17) Deux personnes ont été contactées : Jean et Nicole. 
 ‘Two persons have been contacted : Jean and Nicole’. 
(18) Plus de deux personnes ont été contactées : *Jean et Nicole. 
  ‘More than two persons have been contacted : Jean and Nicole’. 
(17) is fine for everyone, but (18) is awkward for most speakers. 
This contrast, based on apposition, is confirmed by anaphora : (19) is correct, but 
(20) is not : 
(19) J'ai lu trois articles. Ces trois articles sont A, B et C. 
 ’I read three articles . These three articles are A, B, and C.’  
(20) J'ai lu plus de trois articles. *Ces trois articles sont A, B et C. 
 ’I read more than three articles . These three articles are A, B, and C.’ 
In the line of the interpretation of these facts adopted before, we can conclude that 
numerical comparatives do not introduce any set En of cardinality (exactly) n. 
 
Moreover, data indicate that numerical comparatives do introduce the maximal set 
Emax in the semantic representation. The following discourses are perceived as natural 
by many speakers : 
(21) J'ai cité plus de deux auteurs : Platon, Aristote et Sénèque. 
 ‘I mentioned more than two authors : Plato, Aristotle and Seneque.’ 
(22) J'ai cité Chomsky plus d'une fois : une dans l'introduction, une dans le chapitre 
1, … 
 ‘I mentioned Chomsky more than once : one time in the introduction, one in 
 chapter 1,...’ 
In (21) with a conclusive intonation and the presence of the "et", the list is 
interpreted as exhaustive. In (22) it is only required that the list be of cardinality n+1. 
 
It is fair to say that some speakers do not like sentences like (21), but anaphora 
confirms that Emax is actually part of the picture:
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(23) Elle a reçu plus de dix lettres, les a lues et classées. 
 ‘She received more that ten letters, she read and filed them.’ 
All the speakers I asked said that in (23) she read and filed all the letters she 
received. The same is true for (24), an example involving “moins de” : 
(24) Il a fait moins de cinq fautes . Il les a corrigées. 
 ’He made less that five mistakes. He corrected them.’ 
 = He corrected all the mistakes he did. 
We can conclude that for the representation of numerical comparatives, Emax, and 
only Emax  is implied. 
The fact that Emax  is not relevant for numerals (see above) but is relevant for 
numerical comparatives is a confirmation (contra Evans) that it is the nature of the 
antecedent expression itself, not the definite anaphoric NP which is responsible for 
the maximal interpretation. This is confirmed by the similar behavior of anaphora and 
apposition (in which there is no definite NP to be interpreted). 
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In order to represent the maximal set, I will make use of the abstraction operator of 
Kamp & Reyle (1993), noted “Σx”. The abstraction operator is associated to a 
subordinate DRS, and returns the set of all individuals (if there is any) satisfying this 
DRS. Although my representation of more than n is very close to Kamp & Reyle’s  
representation (on page 455), my approach differs on two points : 
I propose this representation only for the more than paradigm, not for the at least 
paradigm; 
I use only one RD, Σx, and not two (Σ /η). 
Using this notation, the following DRS can be proposed as a correct semantic 
representation for plus de deux (more than two). The contrast to the representation of 
the bare numeral is recalled in the table : 
 
Deux étudiants ont appelé 
‘Two students called’ 
 X 
 student (X) 
 called  (X) 
 X = 2 
 
  
Plus de deux étudiants ont appelé 
‘More than two students called’ 
 Σx 
   Σx :  x 
  student (x) 
  called (x) 
  
 Σx > 2 
 
 
 
 
Intuitively, the proposed representation for more than n  :   
1) states that the set satisfying the intersection has more than two members;  
2) introduces this maximal set in the representation making it available for 
anaphoric or appositive references. 
 
Discourse Referents of type Σ  have some peculiarities, as compared to the standard 
DRs, that is to say atomic and plural DRs:  
1.   any maximal set is unique; 
2. there is no claim (in general) that such a set, built by abstraction on properties, 
exists. 
 
The first property means that any truthful embedding will project a given Σ on the 
same set of individuals, and the second property is required by the decreasing 
operators like less than n . 
(25) Moins de deux étudiants ont appelé. 
 ‘Less than two students called.’  
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 Σx 
   Σx :  x 
  student (x) 
  called (x)   
  
 Σx < 2 
  
In (25) the presence of a DR at the top-level does not imply that the sentence is true 
iff we can assign individuals of the Model to this DR. The sentence means that Σx, if 
not empy, has no more than two members. 
 
From the representation assigned to such expressions, it is possible to derive some 
pragmatic constraints on their use. They are analyzed as comparisons : the cardinal of 
the maximal set is compared to a number. As for any comparison, the speaker should 
have a reason to evaluate a cardinal by a comparison to this particular number without 
giving the cardinality of the set. There are at least two good reasons one can imagine : 
1. Because in the context there is a statement, or an expectation that the cardinality 
is n. Consider, for instance, cases in which n is a threshold. If such a standard of 
comparison is provided in the context, it is even possible to give the comparison and 
the cardinality of the set : 
(26) Plus de cinq personnes sont venues. Elles étaient en réalité huit. 
 ‘More than five persons came. They were actually height.’ 
2. Because n is a round number. 
(27) Il y a plus de cent inscrits dans ce groupe 
 ‘There are more than one hundred registered people in this group.” 
 
If none of these conditions holds, it is likely that the sentence will be odd, as (28) 
for instance is : 
(28) Il y avait plus de 187 personnes à la réunion. 
 ’There was more than 187 persons at the meeting.’ 
Any speaker accepting (28) will do so, 187 being not a round number, because she 
thinks condition 1 holds, 187 being, for some reason, a good standard of comparison, 
or an expectation. 
 
The satisfaction of one of those conditions answers the question : why do you give 
this comparison without giving the cardinal itself, if you get it? 
Another question is : how can you be sure that this comparison is correct without 
knowing the cardinal of the actual set itself? Many situations realize this condition : 
suppose you begin to count, and then stop at n for some reason, although you are 
aware that there are some other cases remaining to be counted. It is then natural to 
sate : “All I can say for sure is that there are more than n Xs.”. Another situation is the 
following : you know, by counting, that a given set A has the cardinality n,  and by a 
rough comparison that another set B is smaller : it is then natural to say that B has less 
than n elements.  
Another typical answer to the question is : it is impossible that the actual set be 
(bigger/smaller), because n is a threshold. Consider for instance : John has a driving 
license. He is more than 18, then”. 
 
There are also obvious constraints on anaphora and apposition which come from 
the special nature of Σ : for instance, less than n can be satisfied in models in which 
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there are zero, one, or more individuals of the specified kind; this makes the use of a 
pronoun insecure, because it might be the case that there is no corresponding referent 
at all, and in cases there is, one cannot decide if it is atomic or plural. For apposition, 
it is plausible that some speakers are reluctant to interpret a list as the exhaustive 
enumeration of  Σx because the first part of the sentence does not give the cardinality 
of the introduced set. In my view, the same problem arises for vague plural 
indefinites : 
(29) J’ai lu des livres : A, B, and C. 
 ‘I read some books : A, B, and C.’ 
For such sentences, it is not clear whether the speaker gives a sample, or gives the 
entire list. This is probably why some speakers do not like apposition to numerical 
comparatives. 
 
In other words, the specific nature of the postulated set Σ can explain why 
sentences with numerical comparatives have a restricted dynamic potential.  
 
 
3. Set comparators :  au moins, au plus  [at least, at most] 
 
There are some differences between set comparators and numerical comparatives : 
A. Set comparators are floating expressions:  
(30) Au moins deux personnes sont venues.  
 Deux personnes au moins sont venues. 
 Deux personnes sont venues, au moins. 
 ‘At least two persons came.’ 
B.  Set comparators combine with cardinals, but also with definites : 
(31) Il a invité au moins ses parents et ses frères.’ 
 ‘He invited at least his parents and his brother.’ 
C. As recalled by Krifka (1999) they combine with nominal predicates denoting 
degrees on a scale. 
(32)  Si cette dame est flic, l'est au moins générale. B. Lapointe 
 ’If this woman is a cop, she is at least a general.’ 
I will leave aside, in this paper, the uses of these expressions as discourse particles 
exemplified in (33) : 
(33) Mais au moins, le travail était fait. 
 ‘But at least, the work was done.’ 
This means that I will concentrate on expressions having scope over an NP. 
 
Kadmon (1987) was the first to note that expressions like at least provide two 
interpretations for a pronoun : a reference to the maximal set and a reference to a set 
of (exactly) n elements. 
One might add that this extends to definite or demonstrative anaphoric NPs : 
(34) Au moins deux personnes sont passées ici. Ces deux personnes ont laissé leur 
trace. 
 ‘At least two persons came here. These two persons left their footprints.’ 
In (34), using the results of the argument given in §1 above, one must conclude that 
the first sentence introduces a set of exactly two elements. But the same first sentence 
can provide another interpretation, illustrated by (35): 
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(35) Au moins deux personnes sont passées ici. Ces personnes, dont nous n'arrivons 
pas à déterminer le nombre exact (deux seulement, trois, quatre, etc.), ont fait du 
feu. 
’At least two persons came here. These persons (we cannot state for sure how 
many actually came) made a fire.’ 
In (35), as made explicit by the parenthetical comment, the demonstrative refers to 
the maximal set of individuals satisfying the conditions expressed by the first 
sentence. 
 
Data involving an apposition to at least expressions confirm this : 
(36) Au moins deux personnes sont passées ici : Jean et Pierre. 
 ‘At least two persons came here : Jean and Pierre.’ 
In (36), the appended expression refers to a set of exactly two persons. This 
expression comes usually with a falling intonation suggesting that this expression is 
the exhaustive enumeration of some set. In the logic of the present analysis, we are 
lead to conclude that a discourse referent for this set is introduced in the previous 
sentence. But sentences like (37) are acceptable as well : 
(37) Au moins deux personnes sont passées ici : Jean, Pierre, Nicole… 
’At least two persons came here : Jean, Pierre, Nicole…’ 
The intonation is usually rising, and the sentence suggests then that the list is not 
finished. 
(36) is perfectly natural for all speakers ; (37) is sometimes found less natural, but it 
is very often accepted. It is also possible to find a list of more than n elements, with a 
“et” prefixed to the last element, as in (38), the list being considered as the exhaustive 
set of individuals satisfying the predicates of the sentence : 
(38) Au moins deux personnes sont venues : Jean, Pierre et Nicole. 
 ‘At least two persons came : Jean, Pierre and Nicole.’ 
 
From these observations, we can draw the following conclusions: 
1. at least n can introduce in the representation a set of (exactly) n elements, (like 
numerals); 
2. at least n can introduce in the representation the maximal set (like numerical 
comparatives). 
The most intriguing point is the one supported by the strongest empirical data, that 
is to say the fact that at least n introduces a set of exactly n elements (see (34)and 
(36)). 
 
There are two solutions for accommodating the accessibility of these two sets : 
 
A . The expression at least n is ambiguous. Considering that a lexical ambiguity is 
not likely, the source might be a syntactic ambiguity of at least. This is the view 
adopted by Kadmon (1987) which postulates that at least can be either the modifier of 
the numeral determiner giving a complex determiner at-least-n, or an expression 
taking a whole NP in its scope (at least (n Ns). If at least is analyzed as a complex 
determiner,  the sentence introduces the maximal set; if at least is conceived as an 
operator having an NP prefixed by a numeral in its scope, this NP introduces a set of 
exactly n members, as the bare numeral does in isolation,. 
I discussed in details the problems raised by this approach in Corblin (to appear). 
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B. The relevance of two sets for the semantic representation of at least is not a 
matter of ambiguity, but a basic component of the semantics of the lexical 
expression : this expression introduces two sets abstracted over the syntactic 
environment, and states that a given relation holds between these sets. In this view, 
each occurrence of the expression makes these two sets accessible. 
 
In this paper, I explore the B approach.  
The central idea is that at least/at most introduce two sets, the maximal set  Σx, and 
a set of cardinality n, and compare the cardinality of these sets. 
 
The simplest way to get the semantics of at least from what have been assumed for 
n and more than n so far, would give the following contrast: 
 
 
 
 X 
 student (X) 
 called(X) 
 X = 2 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 Σx 
   Σx :  x 
  student (x) 
  called (x) 
  
 Σx > 2 
 
  X, Σx 
   Σx :  x 
  student (x) 
  called (x) 
  
 student (X) 
 called (X) 
 X = 2 
 Σx  ≥ X 
 
Deux étudiants ont 
appelé 
‘Two students called’ 
Plus de deux étudiants 
ont appelé 
‘More than two students 
called’ 
Au moins deux étudiants 
ont appelé 
‘At least two students 
called’ 
 
 
To have two sets in the representation may seem to give a chance to accommodate 
the dynamic properties : for instance, in (39), the expression Pierre et Jean is an 
exhaustive enumeration of the set X (a set of exactly n members) : 
(39) Deux étudiants au moins ont appelé : Pierre et Jean. 
 ‘Two students at least called : Pierre and Jean. 
 X = {Pierre, Jean} 
In (40), by contrast, the expression Pierre, Jean et Marc is an enumeration of the 
maximal set Σx :  
(40) Deux étudiants au moins ont appelé, Pierre, Jean et Marc. 
 ‘Two students at least called : Pierre, Jean, and Marc.’ 
 Σx = {Pierre, Jean, Marc} 
 
But the first difficulty is to state how these sets are constrained. The semantics of 
the postulated representation for at least given above is awkward: it states that there is 
a set of n elements satisfying a given set of conditions S, and that the maximal set 
satisfying S contains n elements or more than n. Note that if one considers simple 
sentences expressing separately these information, it is impossible to relate them with 
a conjunction : 
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(41) Il a écrit deux livres et * Il a écrit deux livres ou plus de deux livres. 
 ‘He wrote two books *and he wrote two books or more than two.’ 
The only ways to combine these information are (42) or (43) : 
(42) Il a écrit deux livres ou plus de deux livres. 
 ‘He wrote  two books or more than two books.’ 
(43) Il a écrit deux livres et peut être même plus de deux. 
 ‘He wrote two books and maybe even more.’ 
 
Another problem is related to the formulation of the comparison itself. In the working 
representation above, the comparison is between the cardinality of two sets. It is easy 
to show that such a definition would not apply to sentences in which the scope of  at 
least is a definite NP, as in (31). What (31) means is that the maximal set of invited 
persons will include the set denoted by the NP “his parents and his brother”. 
 
If one wants to keep the two set analysis and deal with these two problems, a 
solution emerges which is as follows : 
1. At least sentences introduce two sets in the representation; 
2. One of these sets is Σx, the maximal set of individuals satisfying the set of 
conditions expressed in the sentence (except cardinality). 
3. The second set, X, is constrained by the sole NP is the scope of at least. 
4. At least expresses the set theoretic relation Σx⊇ X. 
 
A solution making use of these features is given in (44) : 
(44) Au moins deux étudiants ont appelé. 
 ‘At least two students called.’ 
 
  X, Σx 
student  (X) 
X = 2 
Σx :  x 
 student (x) 
  called (x) 
 Σx ⊇X 
 
This representation provides two sources for anaphora and apposition, namely Σx 
and X. If X receives a specific interpretation, apposition elucidates the extension of 
the set; X can be used without the speaker having a specific set in mind and it 
amounts, then, to a mere cardinality specification of Σx. 
At least n and n are verified in the same models, although their commitments are 
different. The at least sentence deals with Σx, and specifies its extension by means of 
a disjunction (“⊇”), whereas in the n sentence, the speaker commits herself to no 
more than the mere existence of a set of n satisfiers. 
Its is probably this difference which motivates the thesis that “[atleast/atmost] 
modifiers express modal meaning” (Geurts and Nouwen 2005), a position I adopted in 
the first presentation of this material. I am now less confident that this modal flavor 
should be considered as a part of the meaning. Although a full discussion is far 
beyond the scope of this paper, a few comments might be in order. 
The modal component one might want to consider, states that it is possible that 
more than n elements verify the sentence. It seems that such a commitment could be 
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seen as a pragmatic inference derived from the assertion of the disjunction “Σx ⊇X”, 
not as a part of the meaning proper, and this is a line of thinking I will assume in this 
paper. 
The representation (44) mirrors the following intuition about the at least sentence : 
it introduces a set of exactly n Xs, and states that this set of Xs is a subset of the 
maximal set of Xs verifying the predicates of the sentence. 
 
 
Dynamic data regarding anaphora and apposition show that a two sets analysis is 
needed for au plus. 
The exactly n set is needed, as illustrated by examples like (45) : 
(45) Deux personnes au plus sont venues ici : Jean et Marc. 
 ‘At most two persons came here : Jean and Marc.’ 
The meaning of (45) is roughly : the set of persons who came is empty or inside the 
set {Jean, Marc}. It is difficult, then, to accommodate (45) without assuming that the 
sentence introduces a set of persons of cardinality 2. But this set cannot be a set of 
persons who came, since the sentence asserts that the cardinality of this set is zero, 
one, or two. 
This fact is automatically derived if one makes the rather common assumption that 
au plus belongs to the same semantic category than au moins, namely that it takes two 
arguments, one of them being the set of individuals constrained by the NP it modifies, 
the other one being the maximal set Σx. The difference between the two items is just 
that the meaning of au plus asserts that the relation between the two sets is : X ⊇ Σx. 
 
In what follows a tentative representation of at most sentence will be provided and 
exemplified as a representation of (46). In designing this representation, I wish to 
satisfy the following requirements: 1) preserving the minimal constraint of empirical 
adequacy for truth conditions and dynamic properties; 2; keeping close to the intuition 
which takes at most and at least as related expressions. 
 
(46) Deux personnes au plus sont venues. 
 ‘At most two persons came.’ 
 
  X, Σx 
    person (X) 
 X = 2 
Σx :  x  
  person (x) 
   came (x) 
     
 X ⊇ Σx 
 
 
As previously said, such a representation does not claim that Σx exists : discourse 
referents of type Σx, although located at the top-level of the DRS does not assert the 
existence of the set. The only strong existence claim associated with (46) is the (very 
weak) claim that there is a set X of two persons. 
Note that there is a typical circumstance in which we use such sentences: if we 
know how many individuals of category X there are in a given domain, say n, it is 
13 
possible to assert correctly, for any property P, “At most n Xs P”. If, for instance, 
there are three men in a room, “At most three men P” is a tautology for any P. 
The representation (46) derives correctly the data of apposition for (47): once again, 
it suffices to admit that the appended list is interpreted as the exhaustive enumeration 
of a set introduced in the first part of the sentence, namely the set X: 
(47) Deux étudiants au plus ont appelé : Pierre et Jean. 
 ‘Two students at most called : Pierre and Jean.’ 
 X={Pierre, Jean} 
The commitments of (47) are : 
(i) Pierre and Jean are students; 
(ii) The set {Pierre, Jean} is a superset of the set of students calling if there are any. 
This predicts that a sentence like (48) is not interpretable : 
(48) Deux étudiants au plus ont appelé : Pierre, Jean et Marc. 
 ‘Two students at most called : Pierre, Jean and Marc.’ 
This representation predicts that two sets are made accessible for definite anaphora : 
- X, a set of n Xs;  
- Σx, the maximal, possibly null, intersection set, which in any case is of cardinality 
n or smaller than n. 
A sentence like (48) is not interpretable, because the appended list cannot be 
interpreted as the enumeration of X (the cardinal of the appended set is not 2), and 
cannot be interpreted as the enumeration of Σx because this set is smaller than 2. 
 
According to the view advocated in this paper, the specificity of at least/at most 
quantification can be approached as follows : these expressions work on the basis of a 
"witness set" X of cardinality n, the existence of which is asserted and which is 
provided by the NP in the scope of the expression; they assert a set theoretic relation 
between this set and the maximal set of individuals verifying the conditions expressed 
in the sentence.  
This makes them different from numerical comparatives, which compare the 
cardinality of the (maximal) intersection set to a number (see §2) 
The witness set can be specific, like the corresponding set introduced by a numeral 
can be. In this case, the speaker has a specific set of n individuals in mind as a witness 
set, which can be, for instance, enumerated by an apposition. It can also be non-
specific, like for the corresponding numeral, and then, the identification by apposition 
is impossible. 
Again it is possible to derive modal inferences from a representation so constrained. 
In stating that the members of Σx, if there are any, belong to a given witness set, the 
speaker looks like committing herself to : 
- It is possible that any member of the witness set belong to Σx; 
- It is impossible that other individuals belong to Σx. 
 
A nice feature of this solution, is that it provides a perfect analogy between the 
semantics of at least and at most, which is not the case for my previous proposal in 
Corblin (to appear)
5
.  
Note that it can also explain nicely that at most and at least can be conjoined and 
what happens when they are conjoined as in (49) :  
(49) Three students called, at least and at most 
The representation will be, in short : X, Σx : |X| = 3 ∧ Σx⊇X ∧ X ⊇ Σx. The 
sentence states, in a rather complicated way, that there is a witness set containing 
three students, and that the maximal set Σx is this set.  
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There are even examples discussed in Corblin (to appear) which show that the 
witness set can contain entities which do not satisfy the descriptive content of the NP 
modified by at most.  Consider for instance, the following example : 
(50) Il y a au plus deux solutions. 
 ‘There are at most two solutions.’ 
The interpretation of (50) cannot be : there is a set of two solutions, and the 
maximal set of solutions contains two elements or less than two. What does the 
sentence mean? Roughly the following : there is a set of two “things” such that the 
maximal number of solutions, if there are any is a subset of this set. The necessity for 
this set of “things” is illustrated by sentences like : 
(51) Il y a au plus deux solutions : combattre, ou partir. 
 ‘There are at most two solutions : fighting, or leaving.’ 
The utterer of (51) is committed to the statement that fighting or leaving are 
“possible” solutions, and that if there are solutions, they are in this set. 
This is a special example involving existence as main predication, and involving an 
NP denoting entities (solutions) which may not exist. It should be discussed more at 
length when considering the construction algorithm required for providing the 
representation we need. In the standard cases, the general form of the algorithm will 
be roughly as follows : 
1. build a set X of n satisfiers of the NP to which  at most/at least is attached; 
2. build a set Σx as the maximal set of Xs satisfying the main predicate; 
3. add the condition stating respectively Σx⊇X  or X ⊇ Σx; 
Examples like (51) would require a slight modification of this algorithm. 
 
4. Summary : a brief comparison of numerals and paranumerals 
 
I will now try to sum up and compare the main feature of the three categories . 
 
(a) Trois étudiants 
‘Three students’  
(b) Plus de deux étudiant 
‘More than two students’ 
(c) Trois  étudiants au moins 
 ‘At least three students’ 
Numerals Numerical comparatives Set comparators 
 
 (a), (b) and (c) are true in the same Models. This is general for count nouns, if it is 
clear that their domain can only be divided by integers. 
Only (b) and (c) introduce the maximal intersection set. 
(b) introduces only the maximal intersection set. 
(c) introduces the maximal set and a witness set of n elements. 
 
(b) and (c) are "genuine" quantifiers in the sense that the maximal set is part of the 
picture. 
(a) do not introduce the maximal set, but only a set of n members of the intersection 
set, the relation of this set to the maximal set being left semantically unspecified.  
 
A brief look at the interaction of the three forms with negation shows many 
differences : 
The most striking data regarding negation is that set comparators (au moins, au 
plus) are incompatible with wide scope negation. 
For numerals, it is easy to state the contrast between wide scope negation and 
narrow scope negation : 
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narrow scope: the sentence claims that there is a set of the relevant cardinality 
which does not satisfy the predicate; 
Wide scope : the sentence claims that there is no set of the relevant cardinality 
satisfying the predicate. 
Compare the following sentences in which we try to make the wide scope 
interpretation (there are five glasses such that…) unlikely : 
(52) Je n'ai pas bu cinq verres de vin.      
 ‘I did not drink five glasses of wine.’ 
(53) Je  n'ai pas bu plus de quatre verres de vin. 
 ‘I did not drink more than four glasses of wine.’ 
(54) Je n'ai pas bu au moins cinq verrres de vin. 
 ‘I did not drink at least five glasses of wine.’ 
All the speakers I asked said that (54) is awkward under the wide scope negation 
interpretation, and cannot be accepted unless in an echo context. In contrast, (52) and 
(53) can be used out of the blue with the numeral out-scoped by negation. 
A possible explanation in the light of the proposal would be that the existence of a 
witness set is necessary for computing the interpretation of set comparators. If one 
tries to interpret the set X in the scope of the negation, there would be no existence 
claim of a witness set and the interpretation would be impossible to construct.  
 
Another very interesting piece of data concerns the selectional restrictions of 
predicates taking the considered expressions as argument. M. Hackl (2001) in his 
dissertation on comparative quantifiers (our “numerical comparatives”) points to a 
puzzle related to the present study. 
Hackl observes the following contrast between two sentences which should be 
equivalent in virtue of the equivalence more than n/ at least n+1 for entities counted 
with integers : 
(55) ?John separated more than one animal. 
(56) John separated at least two animals. 
Roughly speaking, the problem is that although (55) takes one as a part of a 
complex expression “corresponding” to a plurality (two, three, or more), it appears as 
if the only relevant feature for selection were the offending singular “one”, exactly as 
in *John separated one animal. 
In the line of our hypothesis what is the problem like? 
At first glance, our theory predicts that for at least n, n should satisfy the selectional 
requirement exactly as a bare numeral should do. The reason is that we have, so to 
speak, a numeral interpretation “within” the representation of the complex expression. 
Prediction (57) is borne out, and illustrated by (58) : 
(57) If n violates a selectional restriction, at least n violates it. 
(58) John separated *one animal → John separated *at least one animal. 
But it is fair to say that our approach does not expect any problem with the more 
than case. The representation contains only the maximal interpretation Σx, which 
stands for a set of a cardinality which should satisfy, in cases like (55), the selectional 
requirement. 
Our own theory predicts that there should be a strong contrast between: 
John separated at least one animal  prediction : out 
John separated more than one animal  prediction  : correct 
It seems to me that there is actually a strong contrast, and that the more than cases 
are not as bad as Hackl suggests; it can even be observed that there are in French 
some colloquial uses of “plus d’un” (more than one) as an understatement for many. I 
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think that such expressions can be used even if the predicate imposes a plurality 
constraint on its argument. 
(59) Ce chronomètre très précis a départagé plus d’un concurrent. 
 ‘This very precise chronometer decided between more than one concurrent.’ 
(60) Ce surveillant est amené a séparer plus d’un éléve dans une journée. 
 ‘This supervisor has to separate more than one pupil within a day.’ 
To my judgment, these examples are correct, although their “at least” 
correspondent would be bad. 
 
5. Some paranumerals difficult to classify 
Other expressions like exactement, à peu près, environ, en tout, fall under the 
descriptive concept “paranumeral” used as a working notion at the beginning of this 
paper. 
I will consider each of these expressions trying to see if it falls easily in one of the 
two categories considered up to now. 
 
Exactement  [Exactly]. 
It is difficult to state if exactement should sit on the more than n side, or on the at 
least n side. The problem is that its lexical meaning makes the two postulated sets, 
distinguished in the course of this study, identical. It is thus difficult to use dynamic 
data for establishing which set is made available. 
The behavior with negation looks more similar to what happens for more than n : 
narrow scope interpretation under negation is acceptable as illustrated by (61) : 
(61) Je n’ai pas parcouru exactement deux kilomètres. 
 ‘I did not walk two kilometers exactly.’ 
But it is a weak argument for deciding, and I leave the question open. 
 
Environ, à peu près  [about] 
 
It is difficult in this case to use dynamic data for contrasting two sets because of a 
complication : environ and à peu près select round numbers. For instance, (62) is 
strange because 47 is not a round number : 
(62) *J'ai à peu près 47 étudiants dans mon cours. 
 ‘I have about 47 students in my course.’ 
For this reason, it is difficult to contrast an "exactly n" interpretation to a maximal 
one. 
Again, I think that the present discussion does not give any conclusive argument for 
choosing to see environ and à peu près as closer to more than n than to at least n. 
 
En tout  [in all] 
 
Although n exactement and n en tout are very often equivalent, there are some good 
reasons for doubting that they belong to the same category. 
en tout n  can only be used if n is obtained by a cumulation of different numbers : 
(63) Pierre mesure 1,80 mètres exactement (*en 
6
tout). 
 ‘Pierre is 1,80 meters tall exactly (in all).’ 
En tout n preserves the possibility to interpret n as a round number, which 
exactement prohibits. 
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(64) J'ai cinquante étudiants exactement.  (False if I have 49 sudents) 
 ‘I have fifty students exactly.’ 
(65) J'ai cinquante étudiants en tout. (True if I have 49 students under the 
interpretation "round number" of fifty).  
 ‘I have fifty students in all.’ 
So en tout does not belong to the exactement paradigm. It is probably another kind 
of paranumeral which is associated to the notion of cumulation. 
 
 
6. Conclusion. 
The main aim of the paper was to contrast different semantic subclasses among 
paranumerals and to show that many expressions which are often put together should 
be carefully distinguished. 
Even if truth conditions are often similar, dynamic properties, as shown in the 
paper, give a basis for distinguishing numerals, numerical comparatives, and set 
comparators. Numerals introduce in the representation a set of exactly n individuals, 
satisfying the conjunction of the NP and VP constraints and assert the existence of 
this set. Numerical comparatives (more/less than n) only introduce in the 
representation the maximal set of individuals Σx satisfying the conjunction of the NP 
and VP constraints, and compare the cardinality of this set to n. Set comparators (at 
least/at most) introduce two sets in the representation, Σx, and a witness set, the 
existence of which is asserted, constrained as a set of n Xs, X being the descriptive 
content of the NP. 
The paper focuses on typical properties and suggests the main features of DRT 
representations dealing with these properties for a restricted set of distributions, 
namely the use of those expressions in construction with NP containing a numeral. 
Many details have been left aside for trying to give a survey of the main contrastive 
features of numeral/paranumeral landscape. 
Among the important points to be considered carefully is the range of constructions 
allowed for each type of expression. It remains to be explained, after all, why those 
expressions can be seen as paranumerals (the association with numerals is typical), 
and why they are not restricted to numerals. The present approach, in other words, 
would have to be subsumed under a more general theory, powerful enough for 
applying to the all range of distributions, and for explaining why numerals are a 
typical distribution. Such a theory is far beyond the scope of this paper, but I would 
like to suggest, as an opening, a contrast in line with the difference postulated in this 
paper.  
At least/at most cannot combine with degree adjectives: 
(66) Il est au moins *grand /*froid 
 ‘It is at least great/cold’ 
At least/at most can only work if they are attached to a constituent, which can be 
interpreted as identifying a precise measure on a scale. The constraint is possibly less 
absolute for comparatives, although it applies strictly to decreasing comparatives :
7
 
(67) Il est moins que *grand /*froid. 
 ‘It is less than great/cold.’ 
A detailed study of the restrictions would be in order before deciding if this 
requirement holds only for at least/at most, or can be generalized. 
The notion of “witness set” used in the present approach for explaining the kind of 
semantic calculus associated to at least/at most would provide a good explanation of 
why this is so : a witness set works as some sort of yardstick, used for the evaluation 
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of a measurable dimension of the maximal set;  this is why an acceptable argument of 
at most/at least must provide a definite point on a scale (a cardinality, or the name of 
a recognized degree) and not a vague comparison to a standard, as degree adjectives 
would do. More work on the more than paradigm would introduce, if the requirement 
can be generalized, a very interesting contrast between  more +than+adj, which put a 
ban on degree adjectives, and more+adj+than… which selects a degree adjective. The 
fundamental contrast to be explored is the contrast between comparing the dimension 
of something to a measure on the relevant scale, and comparing the location of two 
entities on a scale. 
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*
 This paper is a version of the talk presented at the conference « Indefinites and Weak Quantifiers » 
held in January 2005. I owe many thanks to two anonymous readers of this paper. Their comments and 
demands of justification of the version presented at the conference have plaid a great role in convincing 
me that it is possible to provide a semantic representation of at least/at most without any appeal to a 
modal part of the representation (for an opposite view, see Geurts and Nouwen 2005). This explains 
that the paper presents an analysis of these expressions which is closer to my former analysis (Corblin, 
to appear) than the version presented at the conference. I read Geurts and Nouwen (2005) when I was 
finishing the revision of the present paper, which explains that it was not possible to incorporate a 
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discussion of their work. Since my first presentation of this material in the 2002 Nancy’s workshop 
“Existence : semantics and syntax”, I got very interesting comments from B. Geurts, and I had the 
opportunity to hear a couple of talks by him on this topic. I am now convinced that a semantics without 
built in modality is a better way to deal with paranumerals, and I encourage the reader to read Geurts 
and Nouwen (2005) for an opposite view. My work on this topic has greatly benefited from discussions 
with many other people, among others, G. Chierchia, P. Dupuy, O. Matushansky, A. Merin, and V. 
Stanojevic.  
1
 I owe to an anonymous reader of this paper the following example : 
Il faudrait plus que Pierre et Jean (la dernière réunion/mon dernier échec) pour me décourager. 
‘More than Peter and John (the last meeting, my last failure) would be required for depressing me’. 
There are many differences in French between the acceptability of plus que/moins que and plus 
de/moins de that I will not discuss in this paper. 
2
 A. Merin (2003) provides a very strong criticism of this dominant view, and gives very good 
argument for coming back to the thesis that n means “n”, and has no other meaning. 
3
 For the sake of simplification, I do not take into account in this paper the contrast between round 
numbers and others. 
4
 A fact discovered by Kadmon (1987). 
5
 The main difference is that in my previous treatment, the set X in the representation of at least was 
defined as a set of individuals verifying the descriptive content of the NP and the predicate (very 
similar, then, to the interpretation of a bare numeral). Such a choice has two negative consequences: the 
representation of  at least is , so to speak redundant, and the plain extension of this representation, 
mutatis mutandis,  to at most is impossible. In this slightly different version, these two problems are 
fixed. 
6
 A point made by Pascal Dupuy (2004). 
7
 Positive comparatives can be used more freely, althoug they produce with many degree adjectives 
a meaning close to « very » : « C’est plus que froid » (‘It is more than cold’) is interpreted as : « It is 
very cold ».  
